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I. INTRODUCTION AND QUESTION POSED 
In his landmark opinion in United States v. Addyston Pipe 
& Steel Co.,1 then-Judge William Howard Taft focused on the 
question of whether the restraint of trade there at issue was 
the primary motivation for the agreement or “merely ancillary 
to the main purpose of a lawful contract.”2 The doctrine of 
naked and ancillary restraints that Taft developed in 
Addyston Pipe marked the origins of the per se rule and rule 
of reason, which together form the fundamental framework 
that governs the Sherman Act today. In Taft’s presentation, 
restraints of trade must be understood in the context of their 
relationship to the purpose of the primary agreement. Where 
that purpose is legitimate and the relationship of the restraint 
is ancillary, courts should be hesitant to invalidate the 
restraint.  
For decades after Taft’s Addyston Pipe decision, however, 
courts implicitly rejected his purpose-driven framework. As 
one commentator noted, “the rule of reason [was] almost 
completely replaced by a comprehensive network of per se 
rules.”3 A sea-change occurred beginning in the late 1970s 
with the more extensive inclusion of economic analysis in 
antitrust law. Since that time, courts have expanded the class 
of restraints covered by the rule of reason and have been 
increasingly hesitant to apply per se rules of illegality.4 
The rebirth of the rule of reason coincided with a 
rethinking of the purpose of antitrust law. The prevailing 
school of thought, as stated by influential judge and antitrust 
scholar Robert Bork, himself an admirer of Taft and 
proponent of the rule of reason, is that “the only legitimate 
goal of antitrust is the maximization of consumer welfare.”5 
 
1 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).  
2 Id. at 282. 
3 Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious 
Antitrust Role for the Federal Courts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 337 (2000). 
4 Id. 
5 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF 7 (1978). 
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In his review of the legislative history of the Sherman Act, 
Bork concluded that, while “[w]ide discretion was delegated to 
the courts to frame subsidiary rules, . . . the delegation was 
confined by the policy of advancing consumer welfare.”6 
Discussing Senator John Sherman (the Act’s namesake), Bork 
notes that his concern was higher prices, which are caused by 
“what an economist today would call a restriction of output.”7 
“Output” generally refers to the quantity and quality of the 
product or service provided. 
While antitrust scholars and politicians debate Bork’s 
formulation of the goals of antitrust law, perhaps the more 
pressing issue that currently confronts courts is the breadth 
of the consumer welfare model: Specifically, are only those 
justifications (or harms) that can be measured quantitatively 
cognizable under the rule of reason? 
Stated differently, the question is whether “output” should 
be understood narrowly (that is, limited to tangible units that 
are subject to a quantifiable metric) or whether “output” can 
include qualitative, intangible “goods” (education, 
professionalism, health care) that are not subject to (ready) 
quantification.  
Our thesis is that antitrust law has increasingly tended 
towards the narrow, quantitative interpretation of “output,” 
and we support that thesis with a review of case law below. 
We further suggest that output should be recalibrated in the 
Taft tradition to include all dimensions and aspects of the 
legitimate activity to which the restraint is ancillary, even if 
the dimensions and aspects of the activity are intangible and 
not reducible to a quantifiable metric.  
In the latter scenario, the court would assess (1) the 
relationship of the qualitative justification for the restraint to 
the legitimate purpose of the enterprise; (2) the evidence in 
support of the qualitative justification; and (3) the degree of 
ancillarity of the restraint to that justification. If the restraint 
is claimed to cause, or to have caused, a negative price effect, 
the evidence in support of the claimed effect should be 
 
6 Id. at 20.  
7 Id. at 20–21.  
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assessed, as should the comparability of the pre- and post-
restraint prices given the change in quality that accompanied 
the restraint. 
The 2019 Taft Lecture will address the questions of 
whether unquantified benefits and harms are cognizable 
under the rule of reason and, if cognizable, how they should 
be “balanced” under the rule of reason and the consumer 
welfare model. 
II. OVERVIEW OF CASE LAW 
In United States v. Brown University,8 the Third Circuit 
suggested that, in evaluating restraints on competition by 
colleges and universities, courts should consider the 
qualitative purpose of higher education and whether the 
restraints promoted that purpose.9 The Brown University 
court explained that it was “most desirable that schools 
achieve equality of education access and opportunity” and 
that “enhancing the quality of our educational system 
redounds to the general good.”10 
The circuit court found that, when assessing the 
competitive impact of the challenged agreement on the 
colleges’ output, the district court should have considered the 
qualitative goals that the Third Circuit identified as part of 
its rule of reason analysis.11 Such an approach presumes a 
broad understanding of collegiate output to include not only 
the price and quantity of degrees conferred but also the 
welfare of both the student-consumers of education and 
society at large.  
With some ambiguity, the Supreme Court recognized as 
cognizable apparently qualitative justifications for a restraint 
in California Dental Ass’n v. FTC (“Cal. Dental”).12 In that 
case, the Court reversed and remanded a lower court decision 
applying an abbreviated rule of reason, or “quick look” 
 
8 United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).  
9 Id. at 678–79.  
10 Id. at 678 
11 Id. at 678–79.  
12 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
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analysis, to advertising restraints imposed by the California 
Dental Association (the “CDA”). The Supreme Court found 
that the Ninth Circuit, in permitting a presumption of 
illegality, failed to credit the plausible goal of the restraints, 
which was to avoid “misleading or false claims” in dental 
advertising.13 
Cal. Dental thus seemed to recognize that the output of the 
practice of dentistry includes the transparent and non-
deceptive communication between dentist and patient, 
arguably a form of professionalism, and a qualitative 
component that is not readily subject to quantification.14 The 
Court, however, seemed to only partially credit this 
qualitative justification for the restraint, as it noted that 
“misleading or false claims [could] distort the market[,]” 
thereby perhaps returning to a quantifiable paradigm in 
assessing price and output.15 
Cal. Dental held that, if the plaintiff claimed that the 
advertising restraint caused an upward pressure on price, 
some evidence of that price impact was necessary before the 
burden could shift to the defendant to justify the restraint 
under the rule of reason.16 The Court did not offer guidance as 
to how a qualitative justification offsetting such a price effect 
should be presented or assessed.  
More recent decisions have adopted an increasingly 
narrow view of output that ignores aspects not readily subject 
to quantitative metrics. For example, in O’Bannon v. NCAA,17 
which concerned restrictions on student-athlete use of the 
student-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses, both the 
district court and the Ninth Circuit viewed “the NCAA’s 
commitment to amateurism” as procompetitive primarily, if 
not only, insofar as “the amateur nature of collegiate sports 
increases their appeal to consumers.”18 While the O’Bannon 
courts acknowledged that the restrictions played “a limited 
 
13 Id. at 777–78. 
14 Id.   
15 Id. at 778. 
16 Id. at 775 n.12, 777–78, 777 n.13. 
17 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
18 Id. at 1073.  
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role in integrating student-athletes with their schools’ 
academic communities,”19 that justification played an 
immaterial role in their decisions.  
In In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust 
Litigation (“Grant-in-Aid” and, with O’Bannon, the “NCAA 
Cases”),20 the district court confirmed that the benefits of 
amateurism should be viewed in quantitative terms, in 
gauging the impact that amateurism had on the quantity of 
viewership of college athletics.21 In doing so, the court 
considered what level of amateurism was required to prevent 
a drop in viewer demand for college sports.22 The district court 
ultimately concluded that the only restraints that would 
survive the rule of reason scrutiny were those that were 
necessary to prevent “demand-reducing unlimited 
compensation indistinguishable from that observed in 
professional sports.”23 
The immaterial role that qualitative justifications—such 
as the importance of amateurism to the quality and priorities 
of collegiate education—served in the NCAA Cases, however, 
may have resulted from a failure of proof by the NCAA. That 
is, the NCAA appears to have introduced inadequate evidence 
to support the factual basis for such qualitative justifications 
and the relationship between the justifications and the 
restraints. In any event, the vast majority of the competitive 
analysis in the NCAA Cases considered the role of amateurism 
only in securing a greater quantity of viewer demand for 
collegiate athletic contests, and the “gravitational force” of 
that quantitative analyses will affect the rule of reason 
methodology. 
The emphasis on quantitative justifications has also been 
evident in the field of health care. In Saint Alphonsus Medical 
 
19 Id. at 1072. 
20 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019), appeal docketed, Nos. 19-
15566, 19-15662 (9th Cir. Mar 27, 2019).   
21 Id. at 1082–83, 1086. 
22 Id. at 1082–83.  
23 Id. at 1086.  
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Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd.,24 which 
involved the merger of two health care providers, the Ninth 
Circuit rejected a quality-based efficiencies defense. The court 
began its review of the claimed efficiencies by holding that “[i]t 
is not enough to show that the merger would allow St. Luke’s 
to better serve patients. . . . [T]he claimed efficiencies 
therefore must show that the prediction of anticompetitive 
effects from the prima facie case is inaccurate.”25 Those 
predicted “anticompetitive effects” included estimated price 
increases in the services provided by the merged entity.26 
The Ninth Circuit thus required that an efficiency, to be 
cognizable, must offset a predicted price increase, thereby 
placing qualitative benefits, such as the quality of health care, 
that do not have a price-reducing effect outside the scope of 
antitrust analyses.27 That holding is particularly remarkable 
given the relational proximity of the quality of health care to 
the purpose of a hospital. 
The question raised, and not fully answered, by the above 
cases is whether output should be understood only in 
quantitative terms (that is, in terms of quantifiable price and 
units of output). Or, should output include qualitative 
dimensions—for example, intangible goods generated by the 
productive activity? In the latter case, which we support, the 
Taft formulation of the rule of reason would assess (1) the 
relationship of the qualitative justification for the restraint to 
the legitimate purpose of the enterprise; (2) the evidence in 
support of the qualitative justification; and (3) the degree of 
ancillarity of the restraint to that justification. If the restraint 
is claimed to cause, or to have caused, a negative price effect, 
the evidence in support of the claimed effect should be 
assessed, as should the comparability of the pre- and post-
restraint prices given the change in quality that accompanied 
the restraint. 
 
24 Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 
Ltd., 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015). 
25 Id. at 791.  
26 Id. at 786–87.  
27 See id. at 791.  
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To appreciate more fully the question that informs the 
2019 Taft Lecture, we provide a fuller description of the cases 
surveyed above. 
III. COGNIZABLE QUALITATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS: 
THE UNITED STATES V. BROWN DECISION 
In Brown University, the Third Circuit faulted the lower 
court (the Eastern District of Pennsylvania) in part because 
that court failed to give adequate consideration to the “social 
welfare justifications” put forth by the defendant, the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT”).28 At issue 
were the financial-aid-setting practices of the “Ivy Overlap 
Group,” which included MIT and the Ivy League schools.29 The 
Ivy Overlap Group met each April to “jointly determine the 
amount of the family contribution for each commonly 
admitted student[,]” using a common methodology.30  
MIT had argued that financial aid was “pure charity” that 
did “not implicate trade or commerce” and was therefore 
“exempt from antitrust scrutiny.”31 The Third Circuit affirmed 
the lower court’s rejection of that argument. According to the 
Third Circuit, “[t]he exchange of money for services, even by a 
nonprofit organization, is a quintessential commercial 
transaction.”32 The court found that financial aid was “part 
and parcel of the process of setting tuition and thus a 
commercial transaction”; the practices were therefore not 
exempt from antitrust scrutiny.33 
The Third Circuit continued, however: “Although MIT’s 
status as a nonprofit educational organization and its 
advancement of congressionally-recognized and important 
 
28 United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 661 (3d Cir. 1993). As the 
case name implies, the Department of Justice’s action originally involved all 
of the Ivy League schools in addition to MIT; the Ivy League schools 
eventually entered into a consent decree while MIT proceeded to trial. Id. 
at 664. 
29 Id. at 662–63.  
30 Id. at 663.  
31 Id. at 665.  
32 Id. at 666.  
33 Id. at 668.  
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social welfare goals does not remove its conduct from the 
realm of trade or commerce, these factors will influence 
whether this conduct violates the Sherman Act.”34 In that 
regard, the court found that the district court had failed to 
account for some “procompetitive benefit[s]” such as the fact 
that the practices “improved the quality of the educational 
program at the Overlap schools” and “increased consumer 
choice by making an Overlap education more accessible to a 
greater number of students.”35 
The court also found that the “nature of higher education, 
and the asserted procompetitive and pro-consumer features of 
the Overlap, convince us that a full rule of reason analysis is 
in order here.”36 The Third Circuit acknowledged that 
“institutions of higher education [may] require that a 
particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a 
violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated 
differently.”37 The Third Circuit continued: 
It is most desirable that schools achieve equality of 
educational access and opportunity in order that more 
people enjoy the benefits of a worthy higher education. 
There is no doubt, too, that enhancing the quality of 
our educational system redounds to the general good. 
To the extent that higher education endeavors to 
foster vitality of the mind, to promote free exchange 
between bodies of thought and truths, and better 
communication among a broad spectrum of 
individuals, as well as prepares individuals for the 
intellectual demands of responsible citizenship, it is a 
common good that should be extended to as wide a 
range of individuals from as broad a range of socio-
economic backgrounds as possible. It is with this in 
mind that the Overlap Agreement should be 
submitted to the rule of reason scrutiny under the 
Sherman Act.38 
 
34 Id.  
35 Id. at 674–75.  
36 Id. at 678.  
37 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
38 Id.  
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The Brown University court did not approve social welfare 
justifications as a dispositive defense to antitrust concerns 
and indeed stated that “[a] restraint on competition cannot be 
justified solely on the basis of social welfare concerns.”39 It also 
noted that “[t]o the extent that economic self-interest or 
revenue maximization is operative in Overlap, it too renders 
MIT’s public interest justification suspect.”40 
The Third Circuit did not offer guidance on the manner in 
which social welfare benefits are to be assessed under the rule 
of reason. In Brown, a significant portion of the social welfare 
benefits appear to have been attributable to persons who were 
not in the relevant market of prospective student-consumers 
of the educational services of the relevant schools—that is, the 
beneficiaries were largely the general public. In addition, the 
Third Circuit did not comment on how such benefits should be 
assessed in light of a negative price effect resulting from the 
restraint.  
Still, the Third Circuit expressly recognized that “social 
welfare concerns”—a justification that is not susceptible to 
ready quantification—are cognizable in evaluating a 
challenged practice.41 
IV. INCLUDING QUALITATIVE CONCERNS IN 
MARKET ANALYSIS: THE CAL. DENTAL CASE 
In Cal. Dental, the Supreme Court vacated a Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals decision affirming an abbreviated rule of 
reason, or “quick look,” analysis for advertising restrictions 
put in place by the CDA.42 The Federal Trade Commission (the 
“FTC”) had filed a complaint alleging that the CDA 
“unreasonably restricted two types of advertising: price 
advertising, particularly discounted fees, and advertising 
relating to the quality of dental services.”43 
 
39 Id. at 669 (emphasis added). 
40 Id. at 677.  
41 Id. at 668.  
42 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 759 (1999). 
43 Id. at 762. 
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In defending the restraints, the CDA offered qualitative 
justifications, namely that “the restrictions encouraged 
disclosure and prevented false and misleading advertising.”44 
The Ninth Circuit found that those informational 
justifications “carried little weight because ‘it [wa]s simply 
infeasible to disclose all of the information that [wa]s 
required,’ and ‘the record provide[d] no evidence that the rule 
ha[d] in fact led to increased disclosure and transparency of 
dental pricing.’”45 
The Supreme Court, however, took the purported 
justifications more seriously. It found that the challenged 
“restrictions on both discount and nondiscount advertising 
[we]re, at least on their face, designed to avoid false or 
deceptive advertising in a market characterized by striking 
disparities between the information available to the 
professional and the patient.”46 The Court explained that, in 
such a market, “the difficulty for customers or potential 
competitors to get and verify information about the price and 
availability of services magnifies the dangers to competition 
associated with misleading advertising.”47 
The Court further found that “the quality of professional 
services tends to resist either calibration or monitoring by 
individual patients or clients.”48 Additionally: “[t]he existence 
of such significant challenges to informed decisionmaking by 
the customer for professional services immediately suggests 
that advertising restrictions arguably protecting patients 
from misleading or irrelevant advertising call for more than 
cursory treatment as obviously comparable to classic 
horizontal agreements to limit output or price competition.”49 
In response to the supposed anticompetitive effect of the 
restraints found by the Ninth Circuit, the Court questioned 
whether the restraints would ultimately adversely affect 
 
44 Id. at 763–64. 
45 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 
720, 728 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
46 Id. at 771 (footnote omitted). 
47 Id. at 772. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 773. 
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competition, commenting that “the CDA’s rule appears to 
reflect the prediction that any costs to competition associated 
with the elimination of across-the-board advertising will be 
outweighed by gains to consumer information (and hence 
competition) created by discount advertising that is exact, 
accurate, and more easily verifiable (at least by regulators).”50 
We note the Supreme Court’s inclination to link a qualitative 
informational justification to a “market analysis” (rather than 
to view the informational justification as an intangible good 
related to professionalism) in observing that more accurate 
information allows markets to perform more competitively.51 
The Supreme Court also challenged the Ninth Circuit’s 
treatment of the CDA’s quality-based advertising restriction 
as a limitation on output. “[T]he relevant output for antitrust 
purposes[,]” the Court found, was “presumably not 
information or advertising, but dental services themselves.”52 
The Court questioned whether the restraint actually did 
reduce output of dental services, noting that, “[i]f quality 
advertising actually induces some patients to obtain more 
care than they would in its absence, then restricting such 
advertising would reduce the demand for dental services, not 
the supply.”53 The Court therefore did not approve a 
presumption that the advertising restraint was illegal on the 
ground that, in the absence of the restraint, the availability of 
dental services would increase.54 
While the Court considered qualitative justifications for 
the CDA’s advertising restriction, its focus remained 
primarily on the competitive effect of that restriction on the 
output, dental services. In response to the Ninth Circuit’s 
finding that the restriction may prevent the dissemination of 
claims regarding dental-service quality that are “verifiable 
and true[,]” the Court noted that it was “at least equally 
plausible” that “restricting difficult-to-verify claims about 
quality or patient comfort would have a procompetitive effect 
 
50 Id. at 775. 
51 Id. at 779; see id. at 774–75. 
52 Id. at 776. 
53 Id. at 776–77. 
54 See id. 
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by preventing misleading or false claims that distort the 
market.”55 
V. THE NCAA ANTITRUST CASES 
A. The O’Bannon District Court Opinion 
As compared to the Third Circuit in Brown University, the 
Ninth Circuit and underlying courts have treated output more 
narrowly in cases concerning the NCAA’s restrictions on 
student-athlete compensation and have not credited the 
qualitative benefits of education. We note at the outset, 
however, an ambiguity as to whether the courts’ proclivity to 
focus on quantitative output—the viewership of athletic 
contests—was a result of the NCAA’s offering inadequate 
proof of qualitative justifications or a restrictive 
understanding of the type of output that is cognizable under 
the Sherman Act. 
In O’Bannon v. NCAA,56 “a group of current and former 
college student-athletes” brought suit in the Northern District 
of California against the NCAA, which regulates college 
sports on behalf of its hundreds of member schools.57 The 
students challenged “the set of rules that bar student-athletes 
from receiving a share of the revenue that the NCAA and its 
member schools earn from the sale of licenses to use the 
student-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses in 
videogames, live game telecasts, and other footage.”58 
The district court identified two markets, the “college 
education market” and the “group licensing market[,]” that 
were at issue.59 In the former market, the participants were 
“FBS football and Division I basketball schools” on one side 
and “the best high school football and basketball players” in 
 
55 Id. at 777–78. 
56 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
57 Id. at 962–63. 
58 Id. at 963. 
59 Id. at 965 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the country on the other.60 The student-athletes in that 
market could receive scholarships covering education-related 
goods and services such as “the cost of tuition, fees, room and 
board, books, certain school supplies, tutoring, and academic 
support services.”61  
In addition, the students received such benefits as “access 
to high-quality coaching, medical treatment, state-of-the-art 
athletic facilities, and opportunities to compete at the highest 
level of college sports, often in front of large crowds and 
television audiences.”62 In return, the schools received the 
“athletic services” of the students and the right to use “their 
names, images, and likenesses for commercial and 
promotional purposes.”63 
The group licensing market, according to plaintiffs, was a 
market where the students would have, absent the challenged 
restraints, “be[en] able to sell group licenses for the use of 
their names, images, and likenesses[,]” as professional 
athletes do.64 The restraints on compensation prevented that 
market from emerging.65 
The court first examined the effect of the restraints in the 
college education market, finding that the schools had agreed 
“to charge every recruit the same price for the bundle of 
educational and athletic opportunities that they offer: to wit, 
the recruit’s athletic services along with the use of his name, 
image, and likeness while he is in school.”66 The district court 
held that “[t]his price-fixing agreement constitutes a restraint 
of trade.”67 Liability arose despite “[t]he fact that this price-
fixing agreement operates by undervaluing the name, image, 
and likeness rights that the recruits provide to the schools—
rather than by explicitly requiring schools to charge a specific 
 
60 Id.  
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 966. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 968. 
65 See id. 
66 Id. at 988. 
67 Id. 
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monetary price.”68 The court noted that antitrust law 
prohibited “indirect restraints on price[,]” as well as direct 
price-fixing.69 
To defend its restraints, the NCAA offered four 
procompetitive justifications: “(1) the preservation of 
amateurism in college sports; (2) promoting competitive 
balance among FBS football and Division I basketball teams; 
(3) the integration of academics and athletics; and (4) the 
ability to generate greater output in the relevant markets.”70 
All of the above justifications were predicated on the role of 
the restraints in preserving student-athletes as non-
professionals who do not receive compensation for their sports 
services. 
The district court rejected the NCAA’s argument that the 
restraints enhanced the competitive balance among collegiate 
teams.71 The court stated that the NCAA had provided 
insufficient evidence “to show that it must create a particular 
level of competitive balance among FBS football and Division 
I basketball teams in order to maximize consumer demand for 
its product” or that the restraints served that goal.72 
The NCAA also argued that its restrictions increased 
output—namely, “the number of opportunities for schools and 
student-athletes to participate in Division I sports, which 
ultimately increase[d] the number of FBS football and 
Division I basketball games played”—in two ways: (1) “by 
attracting schools with a ‘philosophical commitment to 
amateurism’ to compete in Division I[,]” and (2) “by enabling 
schools that otherwise could not afford to compete in Division 
I to do so.”73  
The district court found, however, that the NCAA did not 
submit sufficient evidence to show that a noteworthy number 
of schools were attracted to Division I specifically because of 
its amateurism commitment, and the court noted that some 
 
68 Id. at 989. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 999. 
71 Id. at 1001–02. 
72 Id. at 1002. 
73 Id. at 1003–04. 
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conferences sought to gain autonomy to make their own rules 
regarding scholarships.74 The court’s reference to a lack of 
evidence supporting a “philosophical commitment to 
amateurism,” such as the primacy of education and the 
subordination of athletics in collegiate “output,” seems to 
imply that it rejected the “philosophical” justification more for 
a lack of evidentiary support than as a matter of law. 
Indeed, the district court found that the “integration of 
academics and athletics” served as a legitimate competitive 
goal.75 The court acknowledged that limiting compensation 
could help avoid a “wedge” from developing between student-
athletes and their fellow students, which should constitute a 
qualitative justification for the compensation restrictions.76 
Still, the court found that, while “[l]imited restrictions on 
student-athlete compensation may help schools achieve this 
narrow procompetitive goal[,] . . . the NCAA may not use this 
goal to justify its sweeping prohibition on any student-athlete 
compensation.”77 The court’s assessment implied that, 
although the qualitative justification was cognizable, the 
justification itself, and the factual and relational ancillarity of 
the restraints to that justification, were not sufficiently 
supported by the evidence. 
The court was also not convinced “that any schools’ athletic 
programs would be driven to financial ruin or would leave 
Division I if other schools were permitted to pay their student-
athletes.”78 In this portion of the opinion, the court analyzed 
output primarily in terms of the number of schools 
participating in Division I athletics. 
The NCAA’s argument that amateurism was “necessary to 
maintain the popularity of FBS football and Division I 
basketball”79 received the most attention in this and 
subsequent NCAA opinions. As discussed below, subsequent 
opinions would focus on the role of amateurism, not in 
 
74 Id. at 1004. 
75 Id. at 1002–03. 
76 Id. at 980, 1003. 
77 Id. at 1003. 
78 Id. at 1004. 
79 Id. at 1000. 
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delivering qualitative educational benefits—“studies over 
sports,” for example—but in increasing the number of viewers 
of athletic contests, whether in person or through some form 
of media.80 
Indeed, the district court in O’Bannon focused on 
amateurism solely as a means of driving viewer demand for 
college athletic contests and thus set the permissible 
compensation of college athletes for the use of their names, 
images, and likenesses at a level that would not reduce that 
demand. The district court enjoined the NCAA from 
prohibiting compensation up to the full cost of attendance and 
$5,000 a year, the latter to be placed in trust for recruits until 
they either left school or ceased being an NCAA-eligible 
student-athlete.81 
The court credited NCAA witness statements that their 
“concerns about student-athlete compensation would be 
minimized or negated if compensation was capped at a few 
thousand dollars per year.”82 It justified this limit by 
explaining that the amount was “comparable to the amount of 
money that the NCAA permits student-athletes to receive if 
they qualify for a Pell grant and the amount that tennis 
players may receive prior to enrollment.”83 
B. The O’Bannon Ninth Circuit Opinion 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit accepted the district court’s 
understanding of the purpose of amateurism, finding that “the 
amateur nature of collegiate sports increases their appeal to 
consumers[,]” and, therefore, the court’s analysis almost 
exclusively focused on whether the restraints were the least 
 
80 See infra Section V.C. 
81 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1007–08. The term “cost of attendance” delineated a 
“school-specific figure defined in the [NCAA] bylaws.” Id. at 971. It included 
“the total cost of tuition and fees, room and board, books and supplies, 
transportation, and other expenses related to attendance.” Id.  
82 Id. at 1008. 
83 Id. 
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restrictive alternatives necessary to “preserv[e] the popularity 
of the NCAA’s product”84 
As an initial matter, the NCAA, on appeal, argued that the 
district court ignored another benefit of amateurism—that 
“amateurism also increases choice for student-athletes by 
giving them ‘the only opportunity [they will] have to obtain a 
college education while playing competitive sports as 
students.’”85 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument on legal 
grounds not relevant to the issues discussed in this Article, 
holding that “[n]othing in the plaintiffs’ prayer for 
compensation would make student-athletes something other 
than students and thereby impair their ability to become 
student-athletes.”86  
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the portion of the district 
court’s ruling enjoining the NCAA from capping student 
grant-in-aid caps below the full cost of college attendance. The 
court found, based in part on the NCAA president’s own 
testimony, that “raising the grant-in-aid cap to the cost of 
attendance would have virtually no impact on amateurism[,]” 
since the money would go to students’ educational expenses.87 
Moreover, “[n]othing in the record . . . suggested that 
consumers of college sports would become less interested in 
those sports if athletes’ scholarships covered their full cost of 
attendance.”88 
By contrast, the court reversed the portion of the district 
court’s ruling allowing schools to place up to $5,000 per year 
in trust for the student-athletes. The Ninth Circuit held that 
the evidence below merely showed that “paying students large 
compensation payments would harm consumer demand more 
than smaller payments would.”89 The court found that “[t]he 
 
84 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The NCAA chose to focus its arguments entirely 
on amateurism, as opposed to the integration of academics and athletics. Id. 
at 1072.  
85 Id. at 1072 (alteration in original) (quoting NCAA submission).  
86 Id. at 1073.  
87 Id. at 1074–75.  
88 Id. at 1075. 
89 Id. at 1077.  
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difference between offering student-athletes education-
related compensation and offering them cash sums 
untethered to educational expenses is not minor; it is a 
quantum leap.”90 Once that line was crossed, the court found, 
athletes could challenge the limit until the NCAA effectively 
transitioned “to minor league status.”91 
The Ninth Circuit gave little attention to a qualitative or 
“philosophical” commitment to amateurism as a means of 
preserving the proper composition of the product or service 
that colleges offer to students as primarily educational—
again, “studies over sports.” Rather, the court focused on the 
role of amateurism in attracting viewer demand to college 
athletic contests. As noted, however, that focus may have 
arisen more from the inadequacy of the presented evidence on 
the importance of amateurism to the composition of collegiate 
output than from a rejection as a matter of law of amateurism 
as a qualitative justification for the rules in question.  
C. The Grant-in-Aid Case 
The Northern District of California revisited the issue of 
student-athlete compensation in a more recent case, focusing 
on amateurism primarily as a means of increasing consumer 
demand. In Grant-in-Aid, a group of current and former 
student athletes again brought suit challenging restraints on 
compensation imposed by the NCAA rules.92 
Prior to the trial, the NCAA did raise the following 
qualitative justification that it did not raise in O’Bannon: 
The challenged rules serve the procompetitive goals of 
expanding output in the college education market and 
improving the quality of the collegiate experience for 
 
90 Id. at 1078.  
91 Id. at 1078–79.  
92 In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 
3d 1058, 1061–62 (N.D. Cal. 2019), appeal docketed, Nos. 19-15566, 19-
15662 (9th Cir. Mar. 27, 2019). The court in that case found that plaintiffs 
were not estopped by virtue of O’Bannon because: (1) there were certain 
differences between the classes; (2) the new suit did not concern name, 
image, and likeness rights; and (3) the rules had changed since the 
O’Bannon decision. Id. at 1092–96. 
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student-athletes, other students, and alumni by 
maintaining the unique heritage and traditions of 
college athletics and preserving amateurism as a 
foundational principle, thereby distinguishing 
amateur college athletics from professional sports, 
allowing the former to exist as a distinct form of 
athletic rivalry and as an essential component of a 
comprehensive college education.93 
The court, however, granted summary judgment for the 
plaintiffs with regard to that justification.94 The court found 
that the defendants’ expert “did not purport to opine on the 
impact of the challenged restraints on output or examine data 
that might support any such opinion.”95 Thus, the court 
concluded that “[d]efendants’ attempt to characterize Dr. 
Elzinga’s opinions as supporting a procompetitive justification 
he did not directly consider is insufficient to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact.”96 
As a result, the district court did not address how 
“improving the quality of the collegiate experience for student-
athletes, other students, and alumni by maintaining the 
unique heritage and traditions of college athletics and 
preserving amateurism as a foundational principle” might be 
cognizable under the rule of reason.97 Yet again, the NCAA 
seems to have offered insufficient evidence of both the 
qualitative justification for the restraint (e.g., amateurism as 
a foundational principle regarding the “collegiate experience” 
of “student-athletes, other students, and alumni”) and the 
degree of ancillarity of the restraints to that justification. 
In its opinion subsequent to a bench trial, the court 
conceived of amateurism in quantitative output terms: 
“Defendants first contend that the challenged rules are 
procompetitive because they promote the principle of 
 
93 In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., No. 14-CV-
02758-CW, 2018 WL 1524005, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2018) (quoting 
NCAA response to plaintiff interrogatories). 
94 Id. at *11. 
95 Id. 
96 Id.  
97 Id. at *10. 
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amateurism, which enhances consumer demand. Defendants 
argue that consumers value amateurism, and that consumer 
demand for Division I basketball and FBS football would 
deteriorate if student-athletes received more compensation.”98 
The NCAA’s evidence consisted of testimony “regarding the 
preferences of viewers of college sports.”99 
As the O’Bannon district court had, the Grant-in-Aid court 
faulted defendants for failing to provide a clear definition of 
amateurism.100 The court pointed to the fact that “[t]he NCAA 
permits grants-in-aid up to the cost of attendance [and,]… [i]n 
addition, student-athletes can receive cash or cash-equivalent 
compensation that exceeds the cost of attendance by 
thousands of dollars.”101 The court found that this additional 
compensation “has not led to a reduction in consumer demand 
for college sports as a distinct product, which continues 
apace.”102 
The court then turned to the evidence offered by the NCAA 
to support its position. It found that defendants’ economics 
expert “did not even attempt to examine whether a 
relationship exists between compensation and consumer 
demand.”103 Indeed, “[t]he only economic analysis in the 
record that addresses the impact of changes to student-athlete 
compensation on consumer demand, that of Dr. Rascher, 
shows that recent increases in student-athlete compensation, 
related and unrelated to education, have not decreased 
consumer demand.”104  
The crucial distinction between college and professional 
sports was the fact that professional athletes could receive 
“unlimited cash payments.”105 Therefore, the court found, 
 
98 In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 
3d 1058, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2019), appeal docketed, Nos. 19-15566, 19-15662 
(9th Cir. Mar. 27, 2019).   
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 1098–99.  
101 Id. at 1099. 
102 Id. at 1099–1100.  
103 Id. at 1100.  
104 Id.  
105 Id. at 1101. 
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“some of the challenged compensation rules may have an 
effect on preserving consumer demand for college sports as 
distinct from professional sports to the extent that they 
prevent unlimited cash payments unrelated to education such 
as those seen in professional sports leagues.”106  
With that holding in mind, the court examined three 
challenged compensation limits: “(1) the limit on the grant-in-
aid at not less than the cost of attendance; (2) compensation 
and benefits unrelated to education paid on top of a grant-in-
aid; (3) compensation and benefits related to education 
provided on top of a grant-in-aid.”107 The court found that the 
first and second categories were procompetitive as they 
“prevent[ed] unlimited cash payments unrelated to 
education.”108 As for the third category, however, the court 
held that: 
limits or prohibitions on most other benefits related to 
education that can be provided on top of a grant-in-
aid, such as those that limit tutoring, graduate school 
tuition, and paid internships, have not been shown to 
have an effect on enhancing consumer demand for 
college sports as a distinct product, because these 
limits are not necessary to prevent unlimited cash 
compensation unrelated to education.109  
Under the court’s new framework, only such limits as were 
necessary to maintain amateurism could be maintained, and, 
as the court clarified, only because doing so enhances 
consumer demand for college sports.110 The Grant-in-Aid 
litigation is on appeal before the Ninth Circuit.111 
 
106 Id.  
107 Id.  
108 Id. at 1102.  
109 Id.  
110 The court found that the “integration” rationale, which was 
acknowledged as cognizable in O’Bannon, did not justify the restraints; 
defendants had “failed to show that the challenged rules have an effect on 
promoting integration . . . .” Id. at 1102–03.  
111 See Defendants’ Joint Opening Brief, Alston v. NCAA, Nos. 19-
15566, 19-15662 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2019).  
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Although the O’Bannon district court identified the 
“college education market” as one of the relevant markets 
affected by the restraint,112 courts evaluating the restrictions 
on student-athlete compensation spent little time discussing 
college education or its purpose. Instead, courts focused on the 
measurable, quantitative impact of the restraints: how many 
more sports consumers watched or attended the games than 
would have if students received unlimited compensation.113  
Although the focus by the courts in the NCAA Cases on 
quantifiable impact may have been the result of a failed 
showing by the NCAA of qualitative justifications,114 the fact 
remains that the “gravitational force” of the NCAA Cases 
litigation strongly favors assessing collegiate amateurism 
solely on quantitative, commercial grounds.115  
VI. THE ST. LUKE’S HOSPITAL CASE 
In the same year as the Ninth Circuit decided O’Bannon, 
the same court limited the consideration of qualitative 
justifications of a health-care merger in Saint Alphonsus 
Medical Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd. 
(“St. Luke’s”).116 In that case, the court deemed the question of 
whether the merger would lead to improved patient care 
irrelevant to its competitive analysis.117 Although that 
 
112 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
113 See supra Part V. 
114 See, e.g., In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., No. 
14-CV-02758-CW, 2018 WL 1524005, at *9–10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2018).  
115 Since the Taft Lecture occurred on September 27, 2019, the State of 
California passed a law requiring schools in California to allow students to 
receive compensation for endorsements, including for their name, image, 
and likeness rights. In October 2019, the NCAA governing board “directed 
its three divisions to immediately consider changing the rules governing 
such benefits for athletes.” Brian Costa & Louise Radnofsky, NCAA Clears 
Way for Athletes to Earn Endorsement Money, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ncaa-clears-way-to-allow-athletes-to-be-
compensated-11572372807 [https://perma.cc/AZ72-5BQY].  
116 Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 
Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 789–92 (9th Cir. 2015).  
117 Id. at 791. 
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analysis was undertaken pursuant to § 7 of the Clayton Act, 
not § 1 of the Sherman Act or the rule of reason, the legal 
cognizability of qualitative justifications should not turn on 
the statutory provision at issue. 
At issue in St. Luke’s was a proposed transaction in which 
St. Luke’s Health Systems Ltd. (“St. Luke’s”) sought to 
acquire the assets of Saltzer Medical Group, P.A. (“Saltzer”) 
and sign a professional services agreement with Saltzer’s 
physicians.118 The FTC, as well as private plaintiffs, brought 
suit to enjoin the merger.119 The parties alleged 
anticompetitive harms in the adult primary care physician 
market.120 
The district court noted that “St. Luke’s and Saltzer 
genuinely intended to move toward a better health care 
system, and expressed its belief that the merger would 
‘improve patient outcomes’ if left intact.”121 Despite those 
benefits, the district court ultimately enjoined the merger 
based on the merged entity’s resulting market share.122 An 
appeal followed. 
The Ninth Circuit first discussed the relevant markets. 
While the parties did not dispute that the adult primary care 
physician (“PCP”) market was the relevant product market,123 
they disagreed on the geographic market.124 Ultimately, the 
Ninth Circuit approved the geographic market found by the 
district court—Nampa County, Idaho—and concluded that 
the plaintiffs had demonstrated that consumers in that 
market would continue to utilize St. Luke’s even in the event 
of a price increase.125 
Regarding the merger’s competitive impact, St. Luke’s did 
not challenge the district court’s findings that the merger 
would lead to a significant increase in the Herfindahl-
 
118 Id. at 781–82.  
119 Id. at 782.  
120 Id.  
121 Id.  
122 Id.  
123 Id. at 784. 
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 784–85.  
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Hirschman Index (a measure of market concentration).126 The 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the finding that “St. Luke’s would 
likely use its post-merger power to negotiate higher 
reimbursement rates from insurers for PCP services.”127 It 
also found, however, that the district court’s holding as to 
whether St. Luke’s would raise prices in the “hospital-based 
ancillary services market” was not supported by the record.128 
Regardless, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had 
proven their prima facie case that the proposed merger would 
substantially lessen competition.129 
Turning to St. Luke’s rebuttal, the Ninth Circuit first 
considered whether post-merger efficiencies could be used to 
justify a merger.130 It noted that, while some circuit courts had 
acknowledged the viability of such a defense, none of them had 
found that efficiencies had offset a prima facie case.131 The 
court stated that it was “skeptical about the efficiencies 
defense in general and about its scope in particular.”132 Still, 
the Ninth Circuit assumed that, “because § 7 of the Clayton 
Act only prohibits those mergers whose effect ‘may be 
substantially to lessen competition,’ . . . a defendant can rebut 
a prima facie case with evidence that the proposed merger will 
create a more efficient combined entity and thus increase 
competition.”133 
The court nonetheless rejected the efficiencies defense 
proffered by St. Luke’s. Importantly, the Ninth Circuit stated 
that the merger could not be justified on the ground that it 
“would allow St. Luke’s to better serve patients”;134 rather, the 
merger must “increase competition or decrease prices.”135 In 
that regard, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the district 
 
126 Id. at 786.  
127 Id.  
128 Id. at 787.  
129 Id. at 787–88.  
130 Id. at 789–92.  
131 Id. at 789. 
132 Id. at 790.  
133 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 18) (citation omitted). 
134 Id. at 791.  
135 Id. 
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court had found that the merger would “likely [have a] 
“beneficial effect . . . on patient care.”136 But the Ninth Circuit 
noted that the district court also found that “reimbursement 
rates for PCP services likely would increase.”137 
The Ninth Circuit also agreed with the district court that 
the claimed efficiencies of transitioning to integrated care and 
establishing a shared electronic record were not “merger-
specific.”138 Even if, however, the proposed remedies were 
merger-specific, the efficiencies defense “would nonetheless 
fail.”139 Importantly for the legal cognizability of qualitative 
justifications, the Ninth Circuit found that, “[a]t most, the 
district court concluded that St. Luke’s might provide better 
service to patients after the merger. That is a laudable goal, 
but the Clayton Act does not excuse mergers that lessen 
competition or create monopolies simply because the merged 
entity can improve its operations.”140 
The St. Luke’s court effectively decided that, in evaluating 
the merger of health care providers in a given community, the 
court was not legally permitted to consider as part of its 
competitive analysis the qualitative impact of the merger on 
health care in that community. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s decision that higher “reimbursement rates for 
PCP services” could be considered in evaluating the merger, 
but improvements in patient care could not.141 
By focusing solely on quantitative metrics, the court 
declined to consider whether the merger, quite literally, would 
improve the welfare of consumers in the relevant market—the 
quality of healthcare available to those consumers. The Ninth 
Circuit also did not recognize that the projected increase in 
reimbursement rates post-merger would occur at the same 
time as a change in the quality of the services would occur. 
Whether that price increase would remain, net of the increase 
in quality, was not addressed.  
 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id.  
139 Id. at 791–92.  
140 Id. at 792.  
141 Id. at 791–92.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
In the cases discussed above, with the exception of Brown 
University, the courts have generally eschewed qualitative 
justifications for a challenged restraint in favor of focusing on 
the quantitative impact on price or units of output. That 
course seems to reflect a skepticism of the validity of 
qualitative justifications for restraints with negative price or 
unit-output effects, which in turn appears to arise from a 
narrow, quantitative understanding of output and a 
preference for that which is empirically verifiable.  
We suggest that such an understanding of output is unduly 
restrictive and reductive. The rule of reason as articulated by 
Judge Taft in an era less enamored of quantitative analysis 
and empirical verification would assess (1) the relationship of 
the qualitative justification for the restraint to the legitimate 
purpose of the enterprise; (2) the evidence in support of the 
qualitative justification; and (3) the degree of ancillarity of the 
restraint to that justification. If the restraint is claimed to 
cause, or to have caused, a negative price effect, the evidence 
in support of the claimed effect should be assessed as should 
the comparability of the pre- and post-restraint prices given 
the change in quality that accompanied the restraint. 
 
 
